T he Enghah logrcran dad marhematician Alan 1 wing, in an attempt to develop a working definition of intclligence free of the ditlicultirs and philosophical pitfalls of defining exactly what constitutes the mental process of intelligent reasoning, devised a test, instead, of intelligent behavior. The idea, codifird in his celebrated 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" [28], was specified as an "imitation game" in which a judge attrmpts to distinguish which of two agents is a human and which a computer imitating human responses by engaging each in a wide-ranging conversation of any topic and tenor. Turing's reasoning was, presuming that intelligence was only practically determinable behaviorally, that any agent that was indistinguishable in behavior from an intelligent agent was, for all intents and purposes, intelligent.
It is presumably uncontroversial that humans are intelligent as evidenced by their conversational behavior. Thus, any agent that can be mistaken by virtue of its conversational behavior with a human must be intelligent. As Turing himself noted, this syllogism argues that the criterion provides a sutXcient, but not necessary, condition for intelligent behavior. The game has since become known as the "Turing Test," a term rbd~ bd., ccbpxd .z\-.zI) h~a cponymou machine in Turing's terminological legacy. Turing predicted that by the year 2000, computers would be able to pass the Turing 'Test at a reasonably sophisticated level, in particular, that the werage interrogator would not be able to identify the computrr correctly more than 70% of the time after a five-minute conversation.
On November 8, 1991, an eclectic group including academics, business people, press, and passers-by tilled two floors of Boston's Computer Museum for a townamenf billed as the first actual administration of the and Joseph Wcizenbarn, professor of computer science emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The prize committee sprnt almost two years in planning the structure of the tournament. Because this was to be a real competition, rather than a thought experiment, there would be several computer contestants, and therefore several confederates would be needed as well.' It was decided that there would be 10 agents all together. In the event, 6 were computer programs. Ten judges would converse with the agents and score them. The judges and confederates were both sctected from the general public on the basis of a newspaper employment advertisement that required little beyond typing ability, and then screened by interview with the prize committee. They were chosen to have "no special expertise in computer science."
The committee realized early that, given the current state of the an, there was no chance that Turing's test, as originally defined, had the slightest chance of being passed by a
